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Juror Questions During Trial:
A Window into Juror Thinking
Shari Seidman Diamond, Mary R. Rose
Beth Murphy, Sven Smith 59 Vand. L. Rev. 1927 (2006)
Allowing jurors to submit questions for witnesses during trial
provides a potentially valuable tool for jurors, as well as a window
into juror thinking. Our study of juror questions is based on a close
examination of the 829 questions jurors submitted during 50 civil
trials and the videotapes of the jury deliberations in those cases. The
vast majority of the juror questions demonstrate a problem-solving
approach consistent with the jurors' role as fact-finders, rather than
as advocates. Jurors use questions to thread their way through the
conflicting evidence presented at trial and produce a plausible
account of the events that led to trial. Their questions generally do
not add significant time to trials. Jurors tend to focus their
questions on the primary legal issues in the cases and to direct them
to witnesses providing testimony on central issues. A substantial
number of juror questions reflect efforts to clarify witness testimony
and fill in gaps, but, in addition, almost half of the questions enlist
an approach we call "Cross-Checking". "Cross-Checking" occurs
when jurors use a process of comparison to evaluate the credibility of
witnesses and the plausibility of accounts offered during trial.
Discussion regarding answers to juror questions does not dominate
deliberations. Rather, the answers to juror questions appear to
supplement and deepen juror understanding of the evidence. In
particular, the questions jurors submit for experts reveal efforts to
grapple with the content, not merely the trappings, of challenging
evidence. Few juror questions suggest an effort to prove a point
rather than to gather information.
The procedures used to guide the questioning process can be
crucial. Drawing upon observations of juries in Arizona and the
federal Seventh Circuit, we describe procedures to optimize the use
of juror questions.
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The jury has undergone a dramatic transformation from its
earliest incarnation when jurors acted as witnesses, investigators, and
tribunal. In the modern American jury trial, the parties determine
what jurors learn during the proceedings. Jurors of today, assigned
the role of audience members until deliberations begin, typically speak
in the courtroom only during jury selection and through their verdict
at the end of the trial. In light of their enforced silence throughout the
trial, jurors have no opportunity to clarify or check on their
interpretation of the evidence and they provide few external
indications about their thinking as the trial unfolds. Although post-
trial juror interviews and jury simulations contribute to our
understanding of how jurors react to evidence, these indirect sources
are not the "on-line" reactions of jurors during trial. The modern veil
on juror participation that conceals juror thinking during trial,
however, is being lifted partially in a small, but increasing, number of
American courtrooms. In these courtrooms, jurors are permitted to
submit questions for witnesses during trial. The questions that the
jurors submit provide a unique window into juror thinking during the
trial.
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The practice of allowing juror questions during trial was
familiar at common law,' but fell into disuse over time. The 2005 ABA
Principles for Juries and Jury Trials recently endorsed it,2 and a few
states now even require judges to tell jurors that they may submit
questions during trial. 3 Most jurisdictions, however, leave the choice to
the judge's discretion 4 and several explicitly forbid juror questions
during trial. 5 Current general practice in jury trials is to limit juror
questions to those submitted to the judge during deliberations. In a
recent national survey of jury trials conducted in the past twelve
months, judges and attorneys reported that juror questions during
trial were permitted in 15% of state and 11% of federal trials.6
Proponents of allowing juror questions suggest that the
opportunity to submit questions will enhance juror comprehension
and encourage deeper involvement by jurors so that they pay more
attention to the proceedings. 7 Opponents argue that permitting juror
questions may upset the adversary system, delay the trial process,
distract juries, and cause jurors to "assume the role of advocates and
lose their impartiality."8 Moreover, judges sometimes express concern
1. United States v. Bush, 47 F.3d 511, 514-15 (2d Cir. 1995).
2. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES & JURY TRIALS, Principle 13(C)
(2005) ("In civil cases, jurors should, ordinarily, be permitted to submit written questions for
witnesses. In deciding whether to permit jurors to submit written questions in criminal cases,
the court should take into consideration the historic reasons why courts in a number of
jurisdictions have discouraged juror questions and the experience in those jurisdictions that have
allowed it.").
3. E.g., ARiZ. R. CIV. P. 39(b)(1); ARIz. R. CRIM. P. 18.6(e); Ashba v. State, 816 N.E.2d 862,
866 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (construing IND. R. EVID. 614(d)); see COLO. R. COUNTY CT. CIV. P. 347(u)
("Jurors shall be allowed to submit written questions to the court for the court to ask of
witnesses during trial ...."); COLO. R. CRIM. P. 24(g); Medina v. People, 114 P.3d 845, 851-52
(Colo. 2005) ("[S]everal states specifically provide for juror questions in court rules or state
statute.").
4. E.g., Bush, 47 F.3d at 514-15; People v. Bacic, 608 N.Y.S.2d 452, 452 (N.Y. App. Div.
1994); State v. Doleszny, 844 A.2d 773, 786 (Vt. 2004).
5. State v. Costello, 646 N.W.2d 204, 214-15 (Minn. 2002) (criminal); Wharton v. State,
734 So. 2d 985, 990 (Miss. 1998) (criminal); State v. Zima, 468 N.W.2d 377, 380 (Neb. 1991)
(criminal and civil); Morrison v. State, 845 S.W.2d 882, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (criminal).
6. E-mail from Paula Hannaford-Agor, Director, Center for Jury Studies, National Center
for State Courts, to author (Sept. 21, 2006) (on file with author) (State of the States survey
results on 11,752 trials: state courts: criminal = 14%, civil = 16%; federal courts: criminal = 11%,
civil = 11%).
7. E.g., B. Michael Dann, "Learning Lessons" and "Speaking Rights" Creating Educated
and Democratic Juries, 68 IND. L.J. 1229, 1253 (1993); MARY DODGE, SHOULD JURORS ASK
QUESTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES? A REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT'S JURY
SYSTEM COMMITTEE 2 (2002), http://www.courts.state.co.us/supct/committees/uryreformdocs/
dodgereport.pdf (last visited Sept. 10, 2006).
8. DODGE, supra note 7, at 2; see United States v. Ajmal, 67 F.3d 12, 14 (2d Cir. 1995)
("When acting as inquisitors, jurors can find themselves removed from their appropriate role as
neutral fact-finders. If allowed to formulate questions throughout the trial, jurors may
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that jurors will hold it against one of the parties if the judge does not
permit the witness to answer a juror's question. 9 Our purpose here is
two-fold. First, we evaluate juror use of procedures that enable them
to submit questions during trial in light of the predictions of
proponents and critics of the procedures. Next, we analyze what juror
questions reveal about how jurors think. To understand how jurors
use the opportunity to submit questions and the role that jurors'
questions and answers play in deliberations, we examined the 829
juror questions submitted in 50 civil jury trials in Arizona, where the
opportunity to submit questions is mandated by court rule.10
The questions submitted by jurors in these trials open a unique
window on juror reasoning because we have not only the questions,
but also videotapes of both the trial testimony and the jury
deliberations for these cases. The few previous researchers who have
analyzed juror questions submitted during trial or deliberations have
not had direct access either to the trial testimony that stimulated the
questions or to jury deliberations." As a result, earlier analyses were
based solely on information that could be gleaned from the questions
on their face. It was not possible, for example, to identify the target of
a juror question (e.g., a particular party or expert) unless the content
of the question made that clear. Without the context from the trial, a
question like one we observed in the Arizona Filming Project-"How
tall is Mr. X?"-would be difficult to interpret or categorize (in this
instance, it was a question for an expert who used Mr. X as a model
for the plaintiff in reconstructing the effect of the accident). Moreover,
even with the benefit of the trial context, juror questions by
themselves may provide only an ambiguous glimpse into juror
thinking. Here we were able to look for further insights from a close
prematurely evaluate the evidence and adopt a particular position as to the weight of that
evidence before considering all the facts. The practice also delays the pace of trial, creates a
certain awkwardness for lawyers wishing to object to juror-inspired questions, and runs a risk of
undermining litigation strategies." (citations omitted)).
9. N. Randy Smith, Why I Do Not Let Jurors Ask Questions in Trials, 40 IDAHO L. REV.
553, 564 (2004).
10. The Arizona rule authorizing the practice of juror questioning in civil cases specifies
that "Jurors shall be permitted to submit to the court written questions directed to witnesses or
the court. Opportunity shall be given to counsel to object to such questions out of the presence of
the jury. Notwithstanding the foregoing, for good cause the court may prohibit or limit the
submission of questions to witnesses." ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 39(b)(10). Consistent with this language,
the standard practice in Arizona is to permit juror questions, and jurors were so instructed in all
50 of the cases we studied.
11. E.g., Nicole L. Mott, The Current Debate on Juror Questions: "To Ask or Not to Ask, That
Is the Question," 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1099, 1111-12 (2003) (examining juror questions collected
by judges and post-trial surveys of jurors, judges and attorneys reporting on their experience
with juror questions).
1930 [Vol. 59:6:1927
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analysis of the jurors as they discussed (or did not discuss) the topic
dealt with in the question during their deliberations.
We begin in Part I by considering the claims made by
supporters and opponents of permitting juror questions during trial in
light of previous research on juror questions. We also provide a
preview of the results from our study of juror questions submitted in
Arizona. Part II describes the data from the Arizona Filming Project.
In Part III, through the lens of the 829 questions that jurors
submitted in the Arizona Project and an analysis of their use during
deliberations, we present a picture of how jurors go about analyzing
and evaluating the conflicting evidence that is presented in a trial.
Our results show that juror questions generally do not add significant
time to trials and tend to focus on the primary legal issues in the
cases. Jurors not only use questions to clarify the testimony of
witnesses and to fill in gaps, but also to assist in evaluating the
credibility of witnesses and the plausibility of accounts offered during
trial through a process of cross-checking. Talk about answers to juror
questions does not dominate deliberations. Rather, the answers to
juror questions appear to supplement and deepen juror understanding
of the evidence. In particular, the questions jurors submit for experts
reveal efforts to grapple with the content, not merely the trappings, of
challenging evidence. Moreover, jurors rarely appear to express an
advocacy position through their questions. Part IV addresses
situations in which permitting juror questions can raise difficulties for
both courts and jurors. Based on the results from Arizona, where the
state courts regularly permit juror questions, and the experience with
juror questions in federal trials in the recent Seventh Circuit Pilot
Project, we show that such situations rarely arise and suggest ways to
limit their occurrence and control them when they do occur. Finally, in
Part V we conclude with some observations about the jury, as revealed
in juror questions.
I. CLAIMS ABOUT THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF PERMITTING JUROR
QUESTIONS
The primary claim made in favor of permitting juror questions
is that it promotes juror understanding of the evidence. 12 To the extent
that jurors are like students in their attempts to understand the
material presented to them at trial, answers to juror questions, like
those given to students in a classroom, offer the opportunity to correct
sources of confusion, clarify misunderstandings, and improve
12. Dann, supra note 7, at 1253.
20061 1931
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comprehension and recall. Some support for this proposition comes
from a national field experiment in which 160 cases in 33 states were
randomly assigned to permit or not permit juror questions. 13 Jurors
who were permitted to submit questions rated themselves as better
informed than those who were not permitted to submit questions. 14
Similarly, in a Colorado field experiment involving 239 criminal trials,
jurors who were permitted to submit questions were more likely to
agree that they had sufficient information to reach a correct decision.
15
Another potential advantage of juror questions is that they can
signal to counsel, as they do to an instructor in a classroom, that some
issues need to be addressed further. It is unclear how often this
occurs, but judges who have permitted juror questions 16 and attorneys
who have tried cases in which questions were permitted 17 report
instances in which the juror questions assisted attorneys in presenting
their cases clearly. Similarly, judges report that jurors appear more
attentive and involved when questions are permitted. 8 Both judges
and attorneys who have experimented with juror questions have
generally become more enthusiastic about permitting juror questions
after trying out the procedure.1 9 Jurors also appreciate having the
opportunity to submit questions. 20
Critics of juror questioning have suggested that permitting
juror questions might upset court decorum and consume unnecessary
court time. The procedures described below in Part III were designed
to prevent any disruption from the addition of juror questions. Prior
estimates of the amount of time added when jurors can submit
questions during trial have varied. Respondents surveyed in a pilot
test in New Jersey estimated that questions added on average thirty
13. Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials: A
National Field Experiment, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121, 122 (1994).
14. Id. at 142-43.
15. DODGE, supra note 7, at 40.
16. See, e.g., Warren D. Wolfson, An Experiment in Juror Interrogation of Witnesses, CHI. B.
ASS'N REC., Feb. 1987, at 12, 17.
17. Howard Ross Cabot & Christopher S. Coleman, Arizona Jury Reform: A View from the
Trenches, ARIZ. J., April 1999; Bill Hethcock, Lawyers Glad Jurors May Query Witnesses, THE
GAZETTE (Colorado Springs), Jan. 3, 2006.
18. See, e.g., Mark Frankel, Judge Frankel on Jurors Questioning Witnesses, 60 WIS. B.
BULL. 23, 24 (1987).
19. See, e.g., Leonard B. Sand & Steven Alan Reiss, A Report on Seven Experiments
Conducted by District Court Judges in the Second Circuit, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 423, 476 (1985); see
also Gregory E. Mize & Christopher J. Connelly, Jury Trial Innovations: Charting a Rising Tide,
41 CT. REV. 4, 5-6 (2004) (providing a review of findings from several studies).
20. Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation in Trials Through Note
Taking and Question Asking, 79 JUDICATURE 256, 260-62 (1996).
1932 [Vol. 59:6:1927
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minutes per trial.21 Estimated time added by juror questions during
trial was higher in a Colorado study in which judges specifically
informed jurors at the end of each witness's testimony that the court
would allow time for them to prepare and submit questions. 22 In both
instances, the measures were estimates based on the survey responses
from case participants rather than actual counts, so it is difficult to
know how accurate they were. Moreover, the procedures used in the
New Jersey and Colorado studies differed, and the procedures that
courts use in permitting juror questions are likely to influence both
the number of questions jurors submit and the amount of time the
questions take.23 For example, if the judge uses a sidebar to consult
with the attorneys in the courtroom but outside the hearing of the
jury, the jury need not be excused during the process and the
procedure consumes little additional time. However, if the judge sends
the jury out of the courtroom while the judge confers with the
attorneys, additional time is required. The Arizona Filming Project,
infra, enabled us to more directly measure the time required to handle
juror questions. Our results closely track the New Jersey estimates.
A separate set of concerns raised about permitting juror
questions is that jurors may react unfavorably if their questions are
not answered. 24 Do jurors take offense or experience unnecessary
embarrassment when their questions are not answered? Do jurors
draw inappropriate inferences when the court does not allow a juror
question? Juror surveys find no evidence to support these concerns,25
but these self-reports about socially undesirable reactions may not
fully capture what occurs in the jury room. The Arizona Filming
Project, however, made it possible for us to examine the questions that
jurors submitted during trial that the judge did not allow and to
assess how jurors actually reacted when a question was not answered.
We found that jurors generally were philosophical, only rarely
expressing surprise, let alone offense, when the judge did not answer
or permit witnesses to answer a question. 26
Finally, critics have expressed concern that jurors given the
opportunity to submit questions may become argumentative, lose their
21. BARBARA BYRD WECKER ET AL., A REPORT BY THE JURY SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE
SUPREME COURT'S CIVIL PRACTICE COMMITTEE 6 (2001), http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us-
reports/civappa.pdf (last visited Sept. 10, 2006).
22. See DODGE, supra note 7, at 33.
23. See infra Part V.
24. See Smith, supra note 9, at 564.
25. See, e.g., Heuer & Penrod, supra note 20, at 260-61.




objectivity and become advocates. These critics argue that jurors may
be transformed by the procedure, changing from neutral triers of fact
who refrain from any evaluation of the merits of each side's case until
the end of the trial to zealous quasi-attorneys who are aligned early in
the trial with one side or the other. Neither of these contrasting
images of the juror comports with what research has shown about how
jurors and juries decide cases. 27 Jurors do not simply record and store
the evidence for later use as they receive it. Rather, they actively
select and organize the trial evidence to construct an account of how
and why events unfolded as they did. They form impressions as they
are exposed to the evidence, although those impressions may change
over the course of the trial as new evidence is presented. As our close
look at juror questions and the way they are used during deliberations
reveals, jurors focus primarily on how to thread their way through the
conflicting evidence presented at trial to produce a plausible account
of the events that led to trial. They use their questions to get
information based on sources the jurors conclude are likely to be
reliable. Their questions seek additional and clarifying information,
explore the plausible alternative explanations for the events that
produced the dispute they are charged with resolving, and reflect
attempts to identify additional indicators that will enable the jurors to
evaluate the quality of uncertain sources. Few juror questions reveal
efforts to prove a point rather than to gather new information.
28
To examine in detail the role played by juror questions during
trial and jury deliberations, we turn now to the juries in the Arizona
Filming Project.
27. See, e.g., W. LANCE BENNETr & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE
COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE 64-65 (1981); Shari Seidman
Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict Consequences: Damages,
Experts, and the Civil Jury, 26 LAw & SOC'Y REV. 513, 557 (1992); Shari Seidman Diamond et al.,
Juror Reactions to Attorneys at Trial, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 17, 43 (1996); Nancy
Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model, 13
CARDOzO L. REV. 519, 519 (1991); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explaining the Evidence:
Tests of the Story Model for Juror Decision Making, 62 J. OF PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL.
189, 189 (1992); Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal
Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 583 (2004).
28. See infra Part IV.C.4.
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II. THE ARIZONA FILMING PROJECT
A. Background of the Project
In 1995, Arizona introduced a controversial rule permitting
juror discussions about the evidence during the trial.29 This rule
constituted a break with the traditional practice of admonishing jurors
to refrain from all case discussion until the end of the trial. Under
Rule 39(f) the court informs the jurors that they can discuss the
evidence amongst themselves in the jury room during the trial. To
assist in evaluating the innovation, in 1998, the Arizona Supreme
Court sanctioned a videotaping experiment in the Pima County
Superior Court in Tucson. In the experiment, cases were assigned to
one of two conditions. Jurors either were told that they could discuss
the case during breaks in the trial or they were told that they should
refrain from any discussion of the case until the end of the trial. As
part of the evaluation, we were authorized to videotape the juror
discussions and deliberations in these trials.
30
The project required an elaborate set of permissions and
security measures. In addition to the judges who agreed to participate
in the project, the jurors, litigants, and attorneys in each case in the
study had to give their consent. 31 All participants were informed of the
Arizona Supreme Court order that ensured strict confidentiality and
limited use of the tapes exclusively to the research sanctioned by the
court.
29. For a description of the rationale and controversy surrounding juror discussions during
trial, see Shari S. Diamond et al., Juror Discussions During Civil Trials: Studying an Arizona
Innovation, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 6-14 (2003).
30. For a complete description of the Arizona Filming Project and the results of the
evaluation, see generally id. at 16-81.
31. Supreme Court of Arizona Administrative Order 98-10 reads in part:
[T]he materials and information collected for the study, including audio and
videotapes may be used only for the purposes of scientific and educational
research. The Court shall take all measures necessary to ensure
confidentiality of all materials. All tapes shall be stored using appropriate
security measures. The materials and information collected for the study,
including audio and videotapes, shall not be subject to discovery or inspection
by the parties or their attorneys, to use as evidence in any case, or for use on
appeal.
In re Civil Jury Filming Project, Admin. Order 98-10, at *1 (Ariz. Feb. 5, 1998),
http://supreme.state.az.us/orders/admorder/orders99/pdf98/9810.pdf (last visited Sept. 10,
2006). As part of their obligations of confidentiality under the Supreme Court Order as well as
additional assurances to parties and jurors undertaken by the principal investigators, the
Authors of this Article have changed certain details to disguise individual cases. The changes do
not, however, affect the substantive nature of the findings that are reported.
2006] 1935
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B. Selection of Jurors and Cases
Jurors were told about the videotaping project when they
arrived at court for their jury service. If they preferred not to
participate, they were assigned to cases not involved in the project.
The juror participation rate was over 95%. Attorneys and litigants
were less willing to take part in the study. Some attorneys were
generally willing to participate when they had a case before one of the
participating judges; others consistently refused. The result was a 22%
yield among otherwise eligible trials.
32
C. The Videotaping Procedures and Data Collection
In each case, the entire trial was videotaped from the opening
statements to the closing arguments and jury instructions. Arizona
does not audiotape or videotape court proceedings, so an unobtrusive
camera was installed in each participating judge's courtroom. The
camera was focused on the witness box in order to capture as much of
what the jurors saw as possible.
33
In the jury rooms used for the research, two unobtrusive
cameras were mounted in opposite corners of the room at the ceiling
level. These cameras made it possible to see jurors seated around the
rectangular table on a split screen without disrupting their normal
seating arrangement. Unobtrusive ceiling microphones recorded the
discussions. An on-site technician was instructed to tape the
conversations in the jury room whenever at least two jurors were
present. 3
4
32. We defined an eligible trial as one that (1) was presided over by a judge who agreed to
participate in the project, (2) began at a time when two participating trials were not already
occupying the video technician, (3) occurred in a courtroom that had been wired for taping near
an available jury room that had also been wired for taping, and (4) was not expected to last
longer than twelve days. Diamond et al., supra note 29, at 17-18 & n.41. Two otherwise eligible
longer trials were excluded to avoid tying up the video-eligible rooms for an extended period in
an effort to maximize the number of cases in the study. Id. To avoid any bias in computing the
response rate, we did not include trials that were assigned on the eve of trial to pro tem judges,
although we were able to tape four of them. Id. We excluded all of the pro tem cases in
computing the response rate because these cases were difficult to track (i.e., permission from the
pro tem judges generally could not be solicited in advance, and the pro tem judges often sat in
courtrooms that were not camera-ready). Id. We did include the data from these four cases in our
analyses of case results. Id.
33. When the camera malfunctioned or was not turned on, we ordered a transcript from the
court reporter. Id. at 18 n.42.
34. A crucial question is whether the jury behavior we observed was affected by the fact
that the jurors were aware that their discussions and deliberations were being filmed. Id. at 22.
The jury experience is a gripping one for most citizens and the compelling interaction with their
fellow jurors captures their attention. Id. at 75. Moreover, the videotapes reveal some
[Vol. 59:6:19271936
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In addition to the trial, discussion, and deliberation videotapes,
additional data on each trial were collected: exhibits, juror questions
(including questions that jurors submitted during the trial but which
the judge did not answer or allow a witness to answer), judicial
instructions on the law, and jury verdict forms. At the end of each
trial, all of the trial participants-jurors, judge, and attorneys-were
asked to fill out brief questionnaires on the trial and on their personal
reactions to the case.
35
D. The Final Sample of Cases
Complete data were obtained on a sample of 50 cases.3 6 The
sample consisted of 26 (52%) motor vehicle cases, four (8%) medical
malpractice cases, seventeen (34%) other tort cases and three (6%)
contract cases. This distribution is similar to the breakdown for civil
jury trials for the Pima Country Superior Court for the year 2001: 62%
motor vehicle tort cases, 8% medical malpractice cases, 23% other tort
cases and 6% contract cases.
37
The 47 tort cases in the total sample varied from the common
rear-end collision with a claim of soft tissue injury to cases involving
severe and permanent injury or death. Plaintiffs received an award in
65% of the cases.38 Awards ranged from $1,000 to $2.8 million dollars
with a median award of $25,500.
conversations and behaviors that jurors presumably would not want to risk being made public or
available to any of the trial participants, suggesting they were not inhibited by the presence of
the cameras. Id. at 22. Previous research on the effects of videotaping on interactive behavior in
non-therapeutic sessions suggests that any initial reactions to being videotaped dissipate
rapidly. Karl E. Weick, Systematic Observational Methods, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 357, 372 (Gardner Lindzey & Elliot Aronson eds., 2d ed. 1968). Thus, although it is
impossible to answer this question definitively, we have no reason to believe that the videotaping
affected the way jurors reached their decisions in these trials. Diamond et al., supra note 29, at
23.
35. The judge and attorneys were asked to complete their questionnaire while the jury was
deliberating, that is, before they knew the jury verdict. Id. at 18. The jurors were asked to fill out
their questionnaires when they had completed their deliberations. Id.
36. One additional case settled during the trial. Id. at 18 n.43.
37. These statistics were provided by the National Center for State Courts. E-mail from
Nicole L. Waters, Court Research Associate, National Center for State Courts, to author (Aug.2,
2004) (on file with author).
38. In our sample, 65% was 30.5 of 47 cases, treating the one hung jury as .5 of a plaintiff
verdict and .5 of a defense verdict. Diamond et al., supra note 29, at 19 n.45. This appears to be
the standard pattern for Pima County. E-mail from Nicole L. Waters, supra note 37. According to
data from the National Center for State Courts, the plaintiff win-rate in Pima County for 2001
was 64%. Id. Motor vehicle jury trials nationally tend to have a higher than average plaintiff
win-rate among tort jury trials (57% versus 48% for jury trials in all tort cases). Carol J.
DeFrances & Marika F.X. Litras, Civil Trial Cases and Verdicts in Large Counties, 1996,





We transcribed the opening and closing arguments in each case
from the trial videotape. We also created a very detailed "roadmap" of
the trial from the videotaped trial to describe the actual order in
which testimony occurred, to reconstruct in substantial detail what
each witness said, and to indicate whether the testimony emerged on
direct examination, cross-examination, or re-direct.
2. Juror Questions
The trial roadmaps included the questions that jurors
submitted to the judge that were subsequently asked of witnesses,
along with the witnesses' responses. We also obtained copies of the
written versions of the questions submitted by the jurors in the case.
The result was a total of 829 questions, 632 (76%) that the judge
permitted a witness to answer and 197 that jurors submitted and the
judge did not answer or allow a witness to address.
3. Data from the Jury Room
To facilitate our analyses of jury behavior in the jury room, we
created quasi-transcripts of the discussions that occurred during
breaks in the trial and verbatim transcripts of all deliberations. The
result was 2,502 pages of discussion quasi-transcripts and 5,276 pages
of deliberation transcripts for the fifty trials.
III. JUROR QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
A. Witnesses and Questioning Patterns
1. Witness Testimony
A total of 438 witnesses (Mean = 8.76 per trial) testified, 392 in
person and 46 through deposition testimony. Because jurors could not
/ctcvlc96.pdf (last visited Sept. 10, 2006). Pima County also has an unusually high
representation of motor vehicle cases among its tort jury trials, 60% for Pima County versus the
national level of 51% estimated in the Department of Justice study. See id.; E-mail from Nicole
L. Waters, supra note 37.
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submit questions when a witness testified only by deposition, our
focus here is on the 392 live witnesses.
Witnesses can be classified in three primary categories: (1)
parties, (2) experts, (3) other fact witnesses. Parties were the group
most likely to testify. Plaintiffs appeared as live witnesses in all cases,
and the defendants testified or were represented by a live witness 39 in
44 of the cases. 40 Experts were also called frequently to give live
testimony. Experts appeared in 43 of the trials, and both sides called
experts in 24 of the trials. Experts appeared more often for the
plaintiff (77 plaintiff experts in 41 trials) than for the defense (45
defense experts in 26 trials). The other live fact witnesses were either
interested (e.g., related to the parties as relatives, friends, or
employers), or they were unrelated (e.g., the passerby who happened
to see the accident). Interested fact witnesses testified in 36 of the
trials; unrelated fact witnesses testified in 21 of the trials. Figure I
shows the breakdown of types of witnesses appearing in the 50 trials:







E unrelated fact witnesses
With Experts Without Experts
(43 cases) (7 cases)
2. Patterns in Juror Questioning
The 829 questions submitted during the 50 trials produced an
average of 16.6 questions per trial (median = 10).
39. If one of the parties was an organization, such as a corporation or governmental agency,
we considered a witness to be representing the party if the witness was either an executive,
administrator, or was centrally involved as a participant rather than an observer in the events
that led to the trial (e.g., the driver of the defendant's company car involved in the automobile
accident that allegedly injured the plaintiff).
40. In one of the no-live-defendant-witness cases, the defendant's testimony was by
deposition.
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The jurors were selective in where they directed their
questions. Trials include a variety of witnesses, some more or less
central to the issues in the case. Some of the witnesses are experts
who provide technical and opinion testimony; others are strictly fact
witnesses. Although jurors submitted at least one question in 48 of the
50 cases, they did not submit questions for every witness who
testified. Instead, they posed questions for 173 (44%) of the 392 live
witnesses (median = 2.11 questions per live witness).41 The number of
questions submitted to the witness increased with the length of time
the witness testified (r = .37).42 As Figure II indicates, on average,
parties and experts stimulated more juror questions than did other
witnesses, both questions that the judge permitted a witness to
answer and questions that were not answered:









party expert interested fact unrelated fact
witness witness
41. The jurors also submitted 13 questions for the judges.
42. (p<.001). This correlation is based on all 388 live witnesses for whom we were able to
measure length of testimony. We defined the length of time of testimony as the real time of each
witness's testimony, including direct, cross, redirect and re-cross, exclusive of side bars, juror
questioning and follow up questions by the attorneys. This length measure thus represents the
amount of testimony that the jurors heard before submitting a question for the question. We
calculated length of testimony for all witnesses in 30 of the cases based on the videotaped
testimony. In the remaining cases, we had full trial court reporter transcripts in 9 cases and a
combination of trial tapes and transcripts in 11 cases (we obtained transcripts when the trial
occurred in a courtroom unequipped with a camera or when a camera malfunctioned). We
calculated the real time of testimony from the transcripts by taking the average number of
minutes per page of witness testimony for four witnesses from two cases in which we had both
real time tapes and corresponding transcripts. Their testimony averaged 1.4 minutes per
transcript page.
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Juror questions for parties were least likely to receive answers
from the witness, 43 in part because impermissible juror questions
about insurance, attorney's fees, or litigation management were
generally directed to one of the parties
44
3. Time Spent During Trial on Juror Questions 45
Prior studies of juror questions have had to depend on the
survey responses of trial participants to estimate the time required for
allowing jury questions. In the Arizona Filming Project, we videotaped
the complete trial testimony in 30 cases and obtained partial (11
cases) or full (9 cases) transcripts in the remaining cases, thereby
allowing us to measure in real time or estimate from the length of the
transcript the time spent during trial on juror questions. We
measured the length of time it took for the judge to handle juror
questions, which included the time taken for sidebars in which the
judge discussed the questions with the attorneys (an average of 15.1
minutes per trial),46 the time used to ask the questions and obtain
answers from the witness or to inform the jurors that a question could
not be answered or would be addressed later (12.2 minutes per trial),
and the time required for any follow-up questioning that occurred
before the witness was excused (6.0 minutes per trial). The result was
a total of 33.6 minutes per trial, which amounted to 1.5 minutes per
hour of trial. This amount of additional time actually used for juror
questions in Arizona is consistent with the estimates from
43. Jurors submitted an additional 20 unanswered questions. The questions appeared only
in handwritten form in the file for the case, and the judge did not read the questions aloud or
share them with any witness during the trial. We were not able to match these questions to a
particular witness.
44. Diamond et al., supra note 26, at 23.
45. We are grateful to the American Bar Foundation Jury Project Advisory Committee
(Dennis Drasco, Robert Grey, Maurice B. Graham, Judge James Holderman, Rebecca Kourlis,
Eugene Pavalon, Patricia Lee Refo, and Justice Miriam Shearing) for suggesting this analysis,
and to Melissa Fitzpatrick for laboriously measuring each element.
46. Of the 392 live witnesses, 352 testified and either received no questions or no break
occurred in the trial between the time jurors submitted their questions and the witness
answered any follow-up questions and left the stand. In those cases, we could be certain that we
had captured any time spent by the judge and attorneys in vetting the questions. For the
remaining 40 live witnesses, we could not directly determine the length of the sidebar because
the content of the sidebar was not recorded on the trial transcript or a break occurred after the
questions were submitted and before the witness completed testifying, so some discussion may
have occurred during the break. In these cases, we estimated the length of the sidebar by
applying the maximum length of the sidebar required to deal with that number of questions in
the cases in which we were able to directly measure the sidebar length. We used the maximum to
avoid underestimating the time used to vet these questions. The imputed values for these 40
witnesses averaged 9.9 minutes per witness, while the average for the remaining 133 witnesses
with at least one juror question averaged 2.7 minutes per witness.
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participants in the New Jersey pilot study.47 Based on this evidence,
fears that trial time will be extended substantially by permitting juror
questions appear unwarranted, at least when the courts and attorneys
manage the process efficiently. We will return to the issue of
procedures for handling questions in Part V.
B. Juror Talk about Questions in the Jury Room
Jurors use the questions they submit and the answers they
receive in multiple ways during deliberations. First, jurors may refer
explicitly to a question and the specific information it generated to
provide background, fill in gaps, or justify a position the juror favors.
More generally, when the question concerns a central issue in the case
(e.g., the assessment of the plaintiffs injury), the answer to a juror's
question may inform talk about the case during deliberations even if
the jurors do not refer specifically to the question itself. A third use of
juror questions can occur when the answer to a juror's question
provides information that enables the jury to eliminate an issue from
consideration. For example, if a witness clarifies why a doctor did not
conduct a particular test or why a possible cause could not have
affected the plaintiffs injury (e.g., alcohol use could not have
contributed to the injury), the answer may obviate the need to discuss
the idea expressed in the question. Such questions thus can exert
influence on what does not get discussed, and may influence juror
impressions of a witness (e.g., a doctor's competence) or redirect jurors
to other cues (e.g., other indicators of the cause of injury). Because we
know only what the jurors said in deliberations as an indicator of their
thoughts, we cannot measure how often this more indirect influence
occurred.
The deliberations do allow us to analyze what jurors said about
the questions they submitted and the answers they received. The
clearest evidence of how the jurors made use of questions during
deliberations came when jurors "announced" that their particular line
of thinking or argument was influenced by a question they or some
other juror posed (e.g., "That's why I asked that question.. ."). In a
medical malpractice case, an expert testified that the physician should
have prescribed a particular medication to the plaintiff. A juror
submitted a question asking how long it would take to see
improvement after administering that medication. In the course of
deliberations, as the jurors discussed whether the drug would have
saved the patient's life, the juror who submitted the question
47. See WECKER ET AL., supra note 21, at 7.
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explained that she had asked how long it would take for the drug "to
become active," noting that the expert had claimed it would take effect
almost immediately. Another juror observed: "But we have no way of
knowing whether [it] would have worked. .. "
To analyze the juror questions and their use by the jury, we
identified and examined each explicit reference to each question
during discussions or deliberations. To qualify as an explicit reference,
a juror had to mention the question or that the answer was generated
by a juror question. For example, a juror said: "Here's the thing. I was
the one that asked the question [about whether the party's actions
were required by a professional mandate]." Another juror responded:
"Yes, very good question." The first juror continued: "And... he [the
defendant] said, "I believe that you have to do it."' The jurors then
discussed what the defendant meant by his response.
Across all 50 deliberations, the jurors explicitly referred to 11%
of the questions they submitted. 48 When they were permitted to
discuss the case during breaks, jurors sometimes mentioned the
questions they had submitted during those breaks. The opportunity to
mention the questions during breaks reduced their references to some
of the questions during deliberations. As a result, the jurors were
more likely to refer explicitly to their questions during deliberations in
trials in which they were admonished not to talk about the case
during trial (15.9%) than in trials in which they were permitted to
discuss the case during breaks in the trial (8.9%).
The explicit references to juror questions during deliberations
provide a conservative estimate of the extent to which jurors
incorporate the information they receive into their decision making.
They do, however, capture all instances in which a juror claimed that
the answer to a particular question deserved the group's attention.
This modest frequency of explicit references to juror questions during
deliberations belies the claim that jurors permitted to submit
questions during trial focus primarily on the answers to those
questions. Rather, the evidence is more consistent with an image of
jurors supplementing what they learn from the trial with answers to
their questions that help them to clarify ambiguities and to
understand apparent omissions and inconsistencies. At the same time,
the references during deliberations indicate that, with at least 1 out of
48. During deliberations, the jurors explicitly referred to 11.2% of 632 questions that the
judge answered or permitted a witness to answer and 11.1% of the 197 questions that did not
produce an answer. Most of the references to the unanswered questions during deliberations
were perfunctory. In cases in which jurors were permitted to discuss the evidence among
themselves during breaks in the trial, jurors made additional explicit references to both
answered and unanswered questions during those breaks.
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9 questions, jurors find it useful to discuss what they have learned as
a result of their questions during trial.
Juror questions in general tended to focus on central issues in
the case (section IV.C. 1 infra). As a result, jurors frequently discussed
topics touched on in juror questions even when they did not refer to
the question. A reliable, precise estimate of how often a jury discussed
a topic implicated by a juror question would depend on how narrowly
or broadly a "topic" was defined. For example, in response to
testimony on the plaintiffs prognosis, a juror asked about the effects
of his medication on recovery. A broad definition of the topic
implicated by this question might include all discussion of the
plaintiffs future activities. A narrow definition might focus strictly on
discussion of the effects of his medication. No matter what standard
was used to define related discussion, however, these discussions may
or may not have been informed by the juror questions or the answers
they stimulated. For example, one juror submitted a question for an
expert asking whether it was possible to tell the age of the injury from
the tests the expert had done. The expert said it was not possible. The
jurors never explicitly referred to the question or the expert's answer.
They did, however, discuss how old the injury likely was. We cannot
determine whether that discussion was influenced by the question or
whether the same discussion would have occurred even if no juror
question had been submitted. The deliberations reflected topics that
the jurors thought worth discussing, and while some of the talk during
deliberations may have been influenced by the juror questions, other
talk no doubt occurred quite independently.
To illustrate how juror questions appear to be used more
broadly during deliberations than the frequency of explicit references
would indicate, we offer the following five case examples:
Case One: This case involved a claim of interference with a
business. The plaintiff testified about the history and practices of its
own business and about the actions the defendant allegedly took to
undermine this work; however, the plaintiff gave considerably less
detail about precisely how the business had been negatively affected
by the defendant's actions. A juror submitted a question on this point,
asking the witness to state specifically what the resulting loss had
been. During deliberations, the information generated by the question
was highly relevant because several jurors saw the plaintiffs loss as
quite small, making it difficult for them to see how the defendant's
actions could actually have interfered with the business. The
deliberations generated 11 separate references to the amount of
damage suffered by the plaintiff. However, these comments never
explicitly linked the assessment to the juror question.
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Case Two: The plaintiff fell after being hit by a large metal
object controlled by the defendant and claimed that the accident
caused serious and permanent injury. The defendant conceded
negligence, but disputed both the way in which the accident occurred
and that the incident in question could have caused such extensive
injuries. One of the jurors asked about the distance between the
plaintiff and the object before it struck him; another asked someone
who had been present at the accident to characterize the speed of the
object as it hit the plaintiff. The jurors discussed both the object's
likely motion and the plaintiffs proximity to the object during
deliberations nine different times as they attempted to piece together
the physics of the incident, the manner in which the plaintiff may
have been hit, and what type of fall likely ensued. No juror ever
explicitly referenced either of the juror questions that addressed these
issues.
Case Three: The plaintiff hired the defendant to repair his
furnace. The defendant repaired the furnace, but informed the
plaintiff that she needed to replace it due to its age. The plaintiff
adjusted some wiring next to the furnace after the defendant
completed the repair. When the furnace caught fire a short time later,
the plaintiff alleged that the defendant was responsible. One juror
asked the defendant how long he had spent in repairing the furnace.
Although much of the deliberation focused on the cause of the fire, a
second theme was the timing of the events and a crucial basis for the
defense verdict was that the jurors were not convinced that the
repairman had been careless or negligent. One element of that
impression may have been his description of the time he spent
repairing the furnace, although, as one of the jurors pointed out, the
repairman's word was the only evidence they received on the amount
of time the repairman spent testing the operation of the furnace.
Case Four: In a rear end accident, the plaintiff claimed that he
had extensive soft tissue injuries to his neck and back as a result of
the collision. The defendant admitted negligence, but argued that no
damage had occurred. The plaintiffs expert testified that the injuries
were causally related to the accident and required several months of
treatment. The defense expert testified that no literature supported a
claim of injury at such a low impact. The jurors questioned the defense
expert about resistance to force in a stationary car and reaction time
in order to compare this accident to a simple bump sustained in
driving over a curb. During deliberations, the jurors discussed both
how a body reacts to different levels of force and how a driver in a low
impact accident is capable of reacting in time to prevent any head or
neck injuries. Without explicitly referring to the juror questions, the
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jury used this information in three separate discussions of damages,
concluding that the plaintiff could not have sustained enough injury to
warrant all of the medical follow-up that occurred.
Case Five: In a medical malpractice suit, the plaintiff claimed
that he suffered partial paralysis from nerve damage produced by a
medical procedure. The plaintiffs expert testified to a reasonable
degree of certainty that the injuries were caused by the treatments
received from the defendant over an extended period of time. The
defense medical expert attributed the injury to an infection and/or
other ailments. Faced with the competing explanations for the injury,
the jury focused on the temporal proximity of the injury to the
treatment provided by the defendant. In one of the juror questions, a
juror asked how long it would take for the paralysis to manifest itself
after the nerve damage. The defense expert responded that the
paralysis would be immediate. The jurors discussed this information
on three separate occasions, along with information on the plaintiffs
other activities, without directly referring to the juror's question. They
concluded that the symptoms would have appeared immediately if the
defendant had caused the injury and that other factors were
responsible for the temporary paralysis. The jury delivered a defense
verdict.
As these examples indicate, jurors frequently discuss and
reason in ways that may be informed by the answers to their
questions without mentioning the questions themselves.
C. Answers about Questions: What Jurors Ask
The primary source of information presented during most civil
trials is the testimony of witnesses who have observed the events that
stimulated the litigation, including the circumstances surrounding the
event itself and the follow-up experiences of the plaintiff that allegedly
resulted from the event. The trial setting generally presents jurors
with two types of evidence about the occurrence and its fall-out. The
first is uncontested evidence that gives the jury the background and
context for the controversy between the parties. The second is
conflicting evidence that the jurors must evaluate in order to decide
which account or accounts are most persuasive. Faced with conflicting
testimony, the jurors must decide who is lying or mistaken and who is
providing accurate information.
Whether the testimony is contested or uncontested, jurors build
their account of the events that led to the trial from what they
understand the witnesses to be saying. The one-sided communication
format used in the traditional trial puts jurors in the role of audience
1946 [Vol. 59:6:1927
A WINDOW INTO JUROR THINKING
members until they begin deliberations. Yet often, the testimony at
trial includes technical terms or phrases. As the jurors listen to the
evidence, they may have questions about the meaning of unfamiliar
terms (e.g., meniscus) or standards (e.g, "reasonable medical
certainty"). In addition, testimony is necessarily selective, guided by
the questions that the attorneys choose to ask, so jurors may crave a
more complete, or at least different, description of what occurred and
when each event took place. 49 When jurors have the opportunity to
submit questions for witnesses during trial, many of their questions
reflect these attempts to fill in gaps or clarify evidence that is not
contested. Requests for clarification, including definitions (e.g.,
"Define actual vs. residual dent.") or to fill in background facts (e.g.,
On what date did you move to [that address]?") were common,
accounting for a quarter of all juror questions. The frequent
submission of these clarification questions is consistent with the claim
that the opportunity to pose questions during trial can enhance juror
understanding and recall.
Juror questions and talk in the jury room, however, provide
some additional insights about juror thinking in the course of the trial.
They reveal the nature of the processing that takes place during trial
beyond simply bolstering recall or clarifying testimony already
presented. Previous research on simulated juries has shown that
jurors are active, rather than passive, audience members in a trial.50
The juror questions provide some evidence of what jurors are thinking
during trial, or at least a picture of some of the ideas they express
through their questions. These juror questions and talk in the jury
room show: (1) the extent to which jurors in ordinary cases have an
early fundamental sense of the legal issues in the case; (2) the efforts
of jurors to evaluate credibility and to "cross-check" the conflicting
information they obtained from the witnesses called by the parties in
the adversarial trial setting; (3) how jurors use questions to engage
with the expert witnesses who pose the greatest challenge to juror
comprehension; and (4) the sparse evidence that jurors engage in
argumentative questioning characteristic of an advocate and
inconsistent with the assigned neutral role of juror.
We used two measures to describe the nature of the juror
questions. The first measure identified law-related questions and
tracked the extent to which the juror questions reflect legal issues in
the case (e.g., causation) even before the jurors receive their final jury
49. Although a sequence of events is easier to understand if it is presented in chronological
order, evidence in a trial generally emerges in a more patchwork fashion. Pennington & Hastie,
supra note 27, at 190.
50. See sources cited supra note 27.
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instructions on the law. We discuss the juror questions concerning
these legal issues in section C.1, infra. The second measure
categorized juror questions according to their focus on background
factual material (definitions and other background facts) and their
reflection of efforts to evaluate witness claims. We discuss these
categories in section C.2, infra. Table 1 shows the distribution for all
of the questions: 51
51. We assessed the reliability of our coding system by having two raters read the same
subset of cases. A "kappa" statistic indicated the extent to which any two raters agreed on which
coding category applied to a question, correcting for how likely two raters would have agreed on
a category by chance alone. See J. Richard Landis & Gary G. Koch, The Measurement of Observer
Agreement for Categorical Data, 33 BIOMETRICS 159, 163 (1977). Kappa values exceeding .61
reflect "substantial" reliability for a coding system; values above .81 reflect "almost perfect"
reliability. Id. at 165. The categories that described the topic of the question (e.g., definition,
standard, insurance) showed substantial reliability. Kappa values ranged from .71 to .73 across
sets of raters who all coded at least 55 questions in common (two coded 65 questions each). The
values were even higher (.75 to .81) if raters received credit for coding a question similarly but
not exactly the same (e.g., both called it a question that asked for a standard but disagreed about
which type of standard. See Jacob Cohen, Weighted Kappa: Nominal Scale Agreement with
Provision for Scaled Disagreement or Partial Credit, 70 PSYCHOL. BULL. 213, 213 (1968)). The
process of determining the legal issue implicated in a question also showed good reliability, with
kappa ranging from .62 to .87 across sets of raters (n = 56 questions).
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Table 1. Nature of Juror Questions*
1949
Also Does not also
Nature of Juror implicates a implicate a legal Total
Question: legal issue issue (%) (%)
(%)
Factual background 26.7% 34.2% 28.1%
Definition 1.3% 4.5% 1.9%
Other background fact 25.4% 29.7% 26.2%
Evaluation 64.1% 49.6% 61.4%
Motivation/character 14.1% 27.1% 16.5%
Credentials/experience 1.5% 9.0% 2.9%
Cross-checking: 48.6% 13.5% 42.0%
Methods/measures 9.8% 4.5% 8.8%
External standards 6.2% 1.3% 5.3%
Other comparison bases 32.5% 7.7% 27.9%
Prognosis/Prediction 5.2% 0.0% 4.2%
Insurance 3.3% .6% 2.8%
Litigation management .7% 7.7% 2.1%
Simply unclear 0.0% 7.7% 1.4%
Total 100.0% 99.8% 100.0%
(N) (674) (155) (829)
*Due to rounding, component percentages do not always add to 100%
1. Legal Issues
The jury's ultimate task is to apply the law to the facts as the
jury sees them. In the course of a trial, jurors develop accounts, or
stories to re-construct and explain the events that led to trial.52 The
52. For a description of the accounts and stories that jurors construct, see, e.g., BENNETT &
FELDMAN, supra note 27, at 41-65 (describing jurors' accounts based on grammatical convention,
causal order, and other cognitive operations); Diamond & Casper, supra note 27, at 516-17, 556-
58 (applying the "story model" to show how jurors actively interpret and assimilate evidence
during trial); Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Judgments About Liability and Damages:
Sources of Variability and Ways to Increase Consistency, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 301, 314-16 (1998)
(finding that a juror's calculation of damage awards is predicted in part by the juror's
background experiences and attitudes); Diamond et al., supra note 27, az 30-31 (tracing the
responsiveness of jurors to changes in evidence over the course of a trial); Pennington & Hastie,
supra note 27, at 521-29, 537-39 (1991) (explaining the story model generally); Nancy
Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explanation-Based Decision Making: Effects of Memory Structure on
Judgment, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY, AND COGNITION 521, 527-31
(1988) (discussing how jurors spontaneously construct a story to summarize the evidence in a
trial).
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facts the jury must find, however, and the standards they must apply
in deciding whether or how much to award in damages, are not
unrelated. For example, developing an account of what happened may
include determining the legal element of whether the defendant's
action caused the plaintiffs injury. Jurors receive little or no
instruction on the specific law of the case until the end of the trial and
thus do not hear from the judge until the point that they must, for
example, identify the cause of the plaintiffs injury. Nonetheless, the
jurors are indirectly exposed to potentially relevant legal issues
through the evidence presented during trial and framed in attorneys'
opening statements. Moreover, jurors come to their task with a
commonsense understanding of the circumstances under which
injured parties are entitled to compensation.
53
Of the 829 jurors questions submitted in these 50 cases, 674
questions implicated legal issues. For example, a juror asked a
plaintiff who was rear-ended, "Were you stopped prior to the
collision?". The question focused on the force at impact, bearing on
whether the plaintiff was injured in the accident. The defendant in
this case had admitted negligence but contested liability, claiming the
plaintiff had not been injured at all.
In the tort cases, which account for 47 of the 50 trials, central
legal issues for the jury include the reasonableness of the parties'
behavior, 54 causality, and damages. Juror questions relating to the
negligence or reasonableness of the specific behavior leading to an
event included questions in which jurors gathered information on the
effort or care (or, in some cases, recklessness) that the defendant
appeared to be putting forth when the alleged tort took place. For
example, in a case in which the plaintiff claimed that a repairman had
damaged his property, a juror submitted a question for the defendant
asking for "the total amount of time spent working" on the project. 55
The issue of causality is implicated when the jurors ask for
assistance in evaluating alternative explanations for the alleged
damages. For example, one juror asked, "Can someone have physical
back pain due to emotional or psychological stress, psychosomatic
53. In a future article on jury instructions, we will describe situations in which jurors'
commonsense understandings diverge from the legal instructions they are asked to apply.
54. The reasonableness of the plaintiffs behavior is a central issue in a comparative
negligence case. E.g., Special Project, An Analysis of the Legal, Social, and Political Issues
Raised by Asbestos Litigation, 36 VAND. L. REV. 573, 627 (1983).
55. In a number of cases, principally those involving soft-tissue injuries, the defendant
argued that the plaintiff had not been injured at all in the accident or that the injuries were
preexisting rather than caused by the defendant's actions. We coded juror questions on the issue
of whether the defendant's behavior had caused any damage at all as questions concerning
causation.
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stress symptoms, or can stress exacerbate pain?". In assessing
causality, jurors frequently expressed interest in knowing the
condition of the plaintiff before the event occurred. For example,
jurors asked treating physicians for more information on the health of
the plaintiff prior to the events that led to the trial, and they asked
plaintiffs about their prior activities.
Finally, questions relevant to damages included those that
focused on the extent and duration of injury that the plaintiff
allegedly suffered. These included, for example, a question for the
plaintiff about whether he had regained use of his right arm and
questions for physicians on the therapeutic course they pursued or, in
the case of defense experts, would have pursued, in treating the
plaintiffs injuries.
Figure III shows the distribution of law-related questions
among the 788 questions jurors submitted during the 47 tort trials in
which the three legal elements could be relevant. As the figure
indicates, these legal issues were implicated in 643, or 81.6%, of the
questions that the jurors submitted:






negligerE./ came damages na specific legal elenent
reasoiableness
It is important to note, however, that not all legal issues were
actually at issue in these cases. Thus, for example, in a case in which
fault is conceded and the dispute is solely about damages, jurors (and
juror questions) should focus on the plaintiffs injury rather than on
the defendant's behavior. To examine the extent to which juror
questions tracked the relevant legal issues in the case, we divided the
trials into three categories: those in which liability was fully
contested, and thus all of the three legal issues were potentially on the
table; those in which negligence was conceded, but fault was at issue
2006] 1951
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
because the defense disputed the claim that the negligence had caused
any injury; and those in which fault was conceded and only damages
were at issue. As Figure IV indicates, juror questions were distributed
substantially in accordance with the relevant legal issues involved in
the case:
Figure IV. Distribution of Juror Questions by Legal
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In the 26 fully contested cases with juror questions, cause and
damages took a second seat to the negligence/reasonableness category,
which accounted for 50.4% of the juror questions. When negligence
was conceded (15 cases), the 223 juror questions shifted primarily to
the issues of causality (31.8%) and damages (47.1%). Finally, in the 4
cases in which only damages were contested, questions about damages
accounted for the lion's share (87.9%) of the 33 juror questions.
In a small number of instances, jurors asked about legal issues
that appeared to be uncontested. While judges permitted witnesses to
answer 76% of juror questions overall, they permitted answers to less
than half (only 6 of 14) of these questions. Three of the 11 questions
about negligence that jurors posed when the defendant had conceded
negligence came from the same case and concerned the condition of
the defendant's machinery before the accident occurred. The judge
used the occasion of the questions to remind the jurors that the
defendant in the case had already admitted negligence. This
admonition may have helped the jurors focus on the legally relevant
issues. They never referred to these questions during deliberations or
discussed the condition of the machinery. In a second case in which
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the defendant had conceded negligence, the jurors also submitted
three questions on negligence, but the issue they focused on was
actually legally relevant. The case involved a claim of comparative
negligence and the questions all touched on the issue of whether the
plaintiff could have been wearing a seatbelt, thus either preventing or
reducing the injury.56 One of the other questions in this category
reveals a legal issue that jurors frequently struggled with. The judge
informed the jurors at the beginning of the case that the defendant
had conceded negligence. A juror asked:
"Somewhere along the way I feel at a loss of the difference between negligence and fault.
How can you be negligent and not be at fault? Is that going to be explained as we go
through this?"
The judge responded:
"Later in the trial if you have a question about the definition of negligence and the
definition of fault, perhaps I will give you some additional information."
No juror submitted a further question on this issue in the case.
The confusion between negligence and fault, omitting recognition of
the need to prove that the defendant's negligence caused injury to the
plaintiff, mirrors the looser use of the terms in everyday speech. In
deliberations, jurors frequently use the term fault to describe the
failure of the defendant to take reasonable care, even when they also
express an awareness of the need to prove causality and injury as
well.
The remaining four questions concerned background facts that
implicated negligence of either the plaintiff or defendant, but had no
bearing on causality or damages (e.g., Did [the defendant] recall
engaging his left hand turn signal?).
In the cases in which the amount damages to be awarded was
the sole legal issue, jurors submitted no questions focusing on
negligence and three questions on causality. Two of their questions
concerned the cause or existence of a particular type of injury
(whether a memory loss was caused by medication; whether an MRI or
CAT scan could show soft-tissue damage). In the third, the juror asked
about the potential role of the plaintiffs work in predisposing him
56. The one question that specifically made the connection between wearing the seatbelt
and the nature and extent of injury also implicated the issues of causality and damages. We
coded it as a negligence question because negligence was also involved. The few questions that
implicated both causality and damages were coded under causality. The rationale for this
approach is in part temporal (i.e., negligence precedes causality, which precedes damages) and
also reflects a conservative count of the legal relevance of the jurors' questions.
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toward injury from the accident. 57 Thus, it could also be considered a
question about the extent of injury from the accident rather than a
question about causality.
This breakdown of the questions submitted by the jurors at
trial reveals that jurors in the tort cases directed four out of five
questions specifically to legal issues that represent the common
elements in tort cases. Moreover, the vast majority of these questions
-98%-focused on the central legal elements in the particular trial.
Another indicator of the extent to which jurors focused their
questions on central issues is the identity of the particular witnesses
who attracted the most questions. We asked the judges to indicate on
their post-trial questionnaires the names of any witnesses who were
"particularly important or crucial" on the issue of liability for the
plaintiffs case and for the defendant's case. Judges named one or
more liability witnesses in 24 of the cases,58 25 witnesses identified as
important to the plaintiffs case and 29 as important to the
defendant's case. Jurors submitted an average of 2.57 questions per
witness for the 200 live witnesses in these cases who testified at least
in part on the issue of liability. The jurors asked substantially more
questions of the witnesses named as most important by the judge than
of witnesses the judge did not identify as most important (3.77 vs.
2.15, t = 2.31, p<.05), providing additional evidence that jurors tend to
focus on the central testimony in a case more than on peripheral
testimony.
2. Juror Evaluation of Contested Facts: Credibility Assessment and
Cross-Checking
In evaluating the credibility of witness testimony that may or
may not be accurate, jurors could in principle use several signals to
reach their conclusions. Does the witness provide a Perry Mason
moment and concede during cross-examination that the direct
testimony was not accurate? Such moments are extremely rare. The
jurors can also use non-verbal cues from the witness. Does the witness
seem emotional, hesitant, evasive or nervous? Does the presentation
seem rehearsed, too perfect, too slick? If Perry Mason moments and
the use of nonverbal communication cues were the only, or even the
principal way, that juries sorted through competing accounts of the
events that led to trial, there would be some substantial reason to
57. As a future article on jury instructions will show, the law, or at least the legal
instructions, on preexisting injury provides somewhat ambiguous guidance to jurors.
58. In the remaining 26 cases, either liability was not at issue or the judge did not complete
the questionnaire or did not name a witness.
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doubt the ability of jurors to assess what witness testimony was most
accurate.
Research has shown that even motivated observers generally
show little ability to detect lying. In a series of experimental studies,
researchers asked observers to judge the accuracy of someone who had
been told either to lie or to tell the truth (and had been provided with
an incentive to be convincing). 59 These studies, however, were
conducted in tightly controlled laboratory settings, and even if they
adequately reflect the weakness of judgments based on presentation
style and content, the studies do not provide the variety of other cues
that the trier of fact can use in the courtroom. Juror attention to these
additional cues about accuracy is revealed in the questions that the
jurors submit during trial.
In the context of a trial, jurors (or judges) can evaluate the
credibility of the testimony a witness gives in light of the witness's
perceived interests. For example, jurors may discount a plaintiffs
claims of injury on the assumption that the plaintiff is exaggerating in
order to obtain a higher award. They may similarly discount the
testimony of experts hired by the parties. These cues, however, may be
weak at ferreting out the relative accuracy of opposing parties and
experts, who generally offer conflicting testimony aligned with their
apparent interest in the outcome of the case.
Jurors can also draw cues on credibility from the internal
coherence and plausibility of the account offered by a witness. If the
internal structure of a witness' testimony does not form a coherent
story (e.g, it includes evidence or implies conclusions inconsistent with
the primary claims of the witness), jurors may discount the credibility
of the testimony.60 The juror questions reveal efforts by the jurors to
find explanations for pieces of evidence from a witness that do not
appear to fit together. For example, in one case a plaintiff reported
that he was severely injured, but he did not permit physicians to run a
CT scan. A juror asked: "Do you remember why you refused the CT
scan in the emergency room?" In another case, a juror wanted to know
whether a client of the defendant was being paid to appear as a
witness.
59. See, e.g., PAUL EKMAN, TELLING LIES: CLUES TO DECEIT IN THE MARKETPLACE, POLITICS,
AND MARRIAGE (1992); see also George Fisher, The Jury's Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575,
707 (1997) ("We could perhaps regard the wonderful convenience of jury lie detecting with more
equanimity if there were any sound evidence that juries are good at this task. But most of the
evidence we have suggests that juries have no particular talent at spotting lies....
[E]xperimental subjects rarely perform much better than chance at distinguishing truth from
falsehood .... " (emphasis added)). Fisher notes also that the experimental setting fails to
replicate the circumstances of the trial. Id. at 707 n. .606.
60. Pennington & Hastie, supra note 27, at 527-29.
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Of all juror questions, 16.5% focused on witness motivation or
character. Only a few directly addressed the interest of the witness by
asking whether the witness was being paid to provide testimony. The
majority of the 137 questions concerning witness motivation or
character asked witnesses about the choices they had made or their
reason for taking or not taking a particular action. Some simply asked
why the witness had or had not done something. For example, a juror
asked one of the plaintiffs who claimed he had been bothered by the
defendant's letters why he had not refused to accept them. In another
case, involving a dispute with an employee, the defendant testified
that problems with the employee's performance had arisen earlier. A
juror responded by asking why the employee had not been fired
earlier.
Jurors directed the majority of their motivation or character
questions to the parties. Parties overall garnered more juror questions
than did other types of witnesses, but their share of the motivation or
character questions was disproportionately high.61 Jurors submitted
almost two-thirds (64.7%) of their motivation or character questions to
the parties, while submitting 48.8% of their other questions to them.
62
This pattern is consistent with the central role played by the parties,
and particularly with the conflicting claims the parties generally make
during trial. Judging their credibility is a central and often difficult
task, and jurors use the opportunity to submit questions to assist in
evaluating the parties' claims.
The other category that reflected directly on judgments about
witness credibility focused on the competence of the witness, either
based on experience or education. Although this information was most
relevant for expert witnesses (e.g., Have you diagnosed other [cases
involving the plaintiffs alleged illness]? If so, how many?), experts
generally begin testifying by describing their background and
experience, which may explain why only 2.9% of the juror questions
fell in this category. Nonetheless, of the juror questions about witness
competence, 68.2% were directed to the experts.
The largest category of juror questions, which we have labeled
Cross-Checking, accounted for nearly half of all questions (42%).
Jurors use cross-checking to assist them in evaluating witness
credibility and judging the plausibility of witness accounts,
particularly those of interested witnesses whose credibility is in doubt.
Jurors look for evidence from disinterested witnesses or non-witness
61.. Jurors also directed most of their questions about insurance and litigation management
to the parties.
62. X2 10.95, p<.001
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sources of probative information to compare that information with
claims from other sources. In cross-checking to test credibility, jurors
apply a commonsense structure to evaluating potentially unreliable
sources of information. Their behavior resembles a pattern identified
by attribution theorists in describing the way that laypersons tend to
draw causal inferences by checking for consensus and consistency
across sources. 63 But here the application extends beyond causal
attribution.64 It reflects more broadly how jurors construct accounts in
response to trial evidence. Another way of describing the process of
cross-checking is that it represents an effort to ascertain the coherence
of a story or portion of a story presented by a witness. 65 For example,
jurors may use this process of checking for consistency to determine
whether a particular behavior is reasonable by seeking information
about the norms typically applied in that industry. Moreover, the
questions jurors submit suggest an emphasis on particular alternative
sources or other types of evidence that jurors perceive as less
susceptible to the influences of interest that are omnipresent in the
adversary setting of a trial. Some of these sources are judgments by
others about what happened and who is responsible. Thus, jurors
submit questions in auto accident cases to find out which of the
parties received a citation (a judgment by a presumably disinterested
police officer). Although the answers to this question and others like it
may in fact be indicators, albeit imperfect ones, of liability or
damages, the rules of evidence may not permit jurors to learn the
answers to them. This is in part because the judgments of others are
imperfect indicators, in part because those other judgments may be
hearsay (e.g., "What did the Emergency Medical Technician say?"),
63. Attribution theory focuses on how people arrive at causal explanations for events. See,
e.g., Harold H. Kelley, Attribution in Social Interaction, in ATTRIBUTION: PERCEIVING THE
CAUSES OF BEHAVIOR 1, 1-24 (E.E. Jones et al. eds., 1972) (reviewing attribution theory in social
interactions). In the trial context, the event is a claim by an interested witness. The task for the
juror is to decide whether the claim is caused by the underlying truth of the claim (e.g., the claim
by the plaintiff that she was injured is caused by the fact that she was indeed injured) or is
attributable to some other cause (i.e., deception or mistake).
64. See Frank D. Fincham & Joseph M. Jaspars, Attribution of Responsibility: From Man
the Scientist to Man as Lawyer, in 13 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 81, 82 (L.
Berkowitz ed., 1980) (recognizing the potential breadth of attribution theory to describe the
process by which the layperson explains events").
65. See Pennington & Hastie, supra note 27, at 528 (describing how consistency,




and in part because they may usurp the jury's independent
assessment.
66
Other juror questions about comparison standards are both
probative and permitted. In fact, they constitute reasonable and
accepted ways of navigating through conflicting accounts. In one case
involving an allegation that one party was driving too slowly for
conditions when the accident occurred, a police officer was permitted
to answer a juror question about whether there was a minimum speed
limit on the highway. In a second case, a juror asked to see a picture of
one of the vehicles involved in the accident in an attempt to compare
the damage done with the claims of the witnesses.
We identified three types of "cross-checking" questions posed
by jurors. The first type of cross-checking occurs when jurors inquire
about the methods or objective measures used, or that might be used,
to shed light on the party's claims. Both juror questions and their
deliberations reveal that jurors are skeptical about subjective reports
from both lay witnesses and physicians. They prefer evidence that
they perceive to be less susceptible to manipulation: (e.g., x-rays and
MRIs as opposed to range-of-motion tests). Thus, some of their
questions attempted to probe the method an expert used to arrive at
the conclusion an expert witness offered about an injury. For example,
in one case a juror asked "What is the basis for your determination
that the nerve was permanently damaged?". In another case, two
different jurors asked "Did the MRI or any x-rays show the [injury]
that [the expert] said she could feel?". In a third case, a juror asked,
"Are non-invasive technologies, such as, but not limited to CAT-Scans
or MRIs, capable of revealing soft-tissue damage? If yes, what can this
reveal and why weren't they used on the plaintiff?". A juror in a fourth
case asked, 'What test, or determination, besides subjective patient's
'say so' determined migraine?". Jurors submitted half (50.7%) of their
questions about methods and measures to expert witnesses, who were
more likely than other witnesses to have conducted, or decided not to
conduct, tests or taken measurements.
The questions about methods and measures that jurors
submitted to lay witnesses asked for documentary, quantitative, or
other objective evidence to support the credibility of a claim. Rather
than questioning a witness on a particular measure the witness used,
the juror sought information on a measure that might assist in
evaluating the claim. For example, a juror asked, "Can we see pictures
66. See Diamond et al., supra note 26, at 22-24 (listing types of disallowed jury questions,
including those regarding legal standards, hearsay, lack of foundation, character determination,
and management of the lawsuit in question).
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of [the plaintiff] before the accident?" In another case, a juror
requested information on the year of an automobile to evaluate
whether it was likely that the vehicle had a seatbelt. In a third case,
the jurors had to assess the value of an automobile and one of the
jurors asked a witness to provide the mileage on the vehicle and the
brand of radio that had been installed in upgrading it. In assessing
the force and extent of injury involved in an accident, jurors asked for
objective indicators. In one case, a juror wanted to know the weight of
the machine that fell on the plaintiff. Jurors in two other cases asked
whether the vehicles involved in the collisions had airbags.
The second type of cross-checking involves a reference to
external standards and occurs when jurors pose questions about rules
or norms, including questions about legal regulations or safety codes,
generally as part of their attempt to assess the reasonableness of a
party's behavior. Thus, jurors asked about the recognized professional
or industry standards concerning note keeping, cleaning facilities
where an accident occurred, or safe operation of equipment. Some of
these standards arise explicitly or implicitly in testimony, usually
when an expert testifies about industry regulations or norms. Other
questions reflect juror inquiries about how the behavior at issue
deviated or was similar to ordinary policy or professional guidelines.
One juror, for example, asked whether the defendant's behavior in
responding to a client matched that recommended by the professional
association.
The third form of cross-checking sought information about
other benchmarks for judging testimony or behavior, especially
evidence of the consistency or inconsistency of a party's behavior or
condition (e.g., state of health) over time and across situations. For
example, a juror asked a witness who worked in an office in which the
defendant allegedly inflicted emotional harm on another employee
whether the witness had ever heard the defendant yell at anyone else.
This attempt to judge whether an account was convincing was also
implicated when jurors asked questions about how events tend to
unfold in different circumstances. Thus, in trying to evaluate an
expert's testimony on the impact of an accident, a juror asked: "How
does this accident compare to a parking lot accident in which the
vehicle would be backed into a light pole?" In a broad sense, the
comparisons in this category reflect a reasoning process by jurors in
which they evaluate a claim by comparing it to what is typical or
expected in a given set of circumstances. For example, a juror wished
to know how many complaints were received against the plaintiff as
an employee compared to a new employee doing a similar job. We also
included in this category questions for experts asking for their opinion
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about what should or could happen in a particular situation. For
example, a juror asked whether a person's job could predispose them
to a particular type of injury. Questions like this essentially ask the
expert to compare this case with the typical situation based on the
expert's experience, in this instance asking whether people who work
in the same type of job as the plaintiff would be at a similar risk.
In conducting this third form of cross-checks, jurors also looked
for behavioral clues that reflected more than a witness's bare claim
(e.g., about how injured they feel), attempting to be reassured that
behavioral manifestations support the accuracy of those claims. Thus,
one juror asked a plaintiff claiming continuing injury whether he was
currently having regular check-ups with specialists. Another juror
asked an expert testifying about the plaintiffs potential for
rehabilitation whether a follow-up evaluation was planned for when
the plaintiff became medically stable. In a third case, a juror asked the
plaintiff whether he wore his brace at home and at work. Each of
these jurors' questions cross-checked for consistency between the
claim and more concrete evidence.
During deliberations, jurors often bemoan the absence of a
witness to the events who is not associated with one of the parties,
and would thus presumably offer a more trustworthy, or at least
independent, account of the events that transpired. Sometimes the
jurors have a specific witness in mind. Other times, the jurors are
simply acknowledging the problem of depending on testimony from a
single interested witness. In either instance, jurors are attempting to
find a basis for judging the credibility of the claims being made by the
conflicting interested witnesses in the trial. Some of these efforts
emerged in the juror questions, as when jurors asked about the
injuries to other passengers or other individuals involved in an
automobile accident.
The cross-checking focus of many juror questions represents a
reasonable approach by jurors to the adversary setting, where a
primary task for the jury is to sort through the testimony of conflicting
witnesses and incomplete evidence to arrive at a verdict. And although
the judge could not permit witnesses to answer all of the "cross-
checking" questions that jurors posed (e.g., did anyone get a citation?),
jurors did receive answers to most (83%) of them. 67
Juror questions in the final three categories were least likely to
be answered. Together they accounted for only 10.1% of all juror
questions, but they illustrate the ways that the rules of evidence set
limits on what jurors might reasonably want to know. Two of the
67. Judges allowed answers to 71.1% of other types of juror questions (X2=16.01, p<.001).
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categories, prognosis and insurance, reflect issues that jurors view as
helpful in determining what compensation the plaintiff might be
entitled to receive. When a plaintiff claims to have a continuing injury,
jurors recognize that they may have to face the task of determining
future medical expenses. Questions about plaintiffs prognosis (e.g.,
How much time and effort would it take to treat [plaintiffs alleged
injury]?) constituted 4.2% of the submitted questions. Some of them
called for speculation, particularly when they were directed to a non-
expert, and judges allowed only 57% of these questions about
prognosis to be answered.
Questions about insurance reflect an interesting dilemma for
jurors. Jurors recognize that if they find for the plaintiff they will have
to determine compensation, so they frequently wonder about
alternative sources of compensation for the plaintiff, as well as
insurance coverage more generally. 68 Indeed, insurance is a frequent
topic during deliberations.6 9 For example, jurors express concern about
over-compensating a plaintiff who has already received money from
insurance.70 Some juror concern about determining the appropriate
level of compensation is reflected in their questions about insurance,
which represented 2.8% of the submitted questions. Because the rules
of evidence preclude testimony about insurance in most situations,
judges refused to allow witnesses to answer any of the juror questions
about insurance or attorneys fees.
Finally, jurors asked several questions about the management
of the litigation (2.1%). Some of these questions appeared to implicate
credibility assessments (e.g., "Did you go to [Dr. X] because your
lawyer told you or was it your idea?"), but for others it was unclear
precisely why the juror submitted the question (e.g., "What was the
date of the deposition?").
The overall distribution of juror questions reveals active efforts
by the jurors to use their questions to unpack and understand the
factual underpinnings of the case and evaluate the evidence. The
deliberations indicate that the jurors use what they learn from
answers to their questions, but the questions do not dominate the
deliberations.
68. For a discussion of the role of insurance in the jury deliberations, see Shari Seidman
Diamond & Neil Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden Topics, 87 VA. L. REV. 1857,
1874-95 (2001).
69. See id. at 1876 (stating that juries discussed insurance during deliberations in 85% of
the cases studied).
70. See id. at 1878-79 (providing examples of when juries limited a plaintiffs damage award




Complex expert testimony presents a challenge to both judges
and juries.71 Triers of fact are asked to assess the persuasiveness of
technical information from credentialed sources talking about
unfamiliar topics. Commentators have expressed concern that jurors
will be impressed by jargon and so overawed by credentials that they
may be misled by "its aura of special reliability and trustworthiness" 72
and as a result uncritically accept expert testimony as true. Experts
are common in civil litigation, and the 122 experts who gave live
testimony in the Arizona Filming Project included physicians and
mental health professionals, as well as engineers, financial analysts,
and academic scientists. Many of the physicians who testified for the
plaintiffs were treating physicians who also gave factual testimony.
Juror questions during trial provide an "on-line" indicator of how
jurors process expert testimony.
Research on cognitive processing distinguishes between two
reactions to persuasive attempts. 73 The first is peripheral or heuristic
processing which occurs when decision makers are either unmotivated
or unable to evaluate the arguments that a communicator is making.
Under those circumstances, the decision maker is inclined to use a
short cut, a heuristic, to decide whether or not to accept the claims
being made. The prestige of the communicator-her occupation or
education-provides a peripheral cue to the decision maker that, all
other things being equal, he should accept the claims that the high
prestige communicator, the expert, is making. If jurors were
motivated to avoid the effort of evaluating expert evidence, or if they
simply were unable to process the information an expert was offering,
they could simply defer and accept the conclusions without engaging
in any deeper processing. Jurors would be engaged in peripheral
processing if they merely compared the credentials of two opposing
experts and accepted the opinions of the more prestigious source.
A second form of processing, central or systematic processing,
occurs when a decision maker is motivated to understand and
evaluate a persuasive communication, scrutinizing the quality of the
arguments and not simply deferring to the claims of a prestigious
71. Daubert v. Merrell-Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995); Shari
Seidman Diamond, Truth, Justice, and the Jury, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 143, 153-54 (2003).
72. United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973).
73. ALICE H. EAGLY & SHELLY CHAIKEN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTITUDES 326-27 (1993).
Shelly Chaiken, The Heuristic Model of Persuasion, in 5 SOCIAL INFLUENCE: THE ONTARIO
SYMPOSIUM 3 (Mark P. Zanna et al. eds., 1987); RICHARD E. PETTY, COMMUNICATION AND
PERSUASION: CENTRAL AND PERIPHERAL ROUTES TO ATTITUDE CHANGE 3 (John T. Cacioppo ed.,
1986).
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source.7 4 The questions jurors submitted to the experts provide a
picture of how jurors attempted to deal with expert testimony as it
was being presented during trial.
The clearest evidence of peripheral processing would emerge if
jurors failed to submit questions to the expert witnesses at all or if
they asked only about credentials or experience. In fact, jurors
submitted questions for almost half (47.5%) of the expert witnesses,
averaging 2.11 questions per witness. Only 15 (5.8%) of the 257
questions concerned credentials or experience. Instead, the nature of
the questions generally reflected attempts by the jurors to understand
and evaluate the content of the testimony. Many of the questions
focused on alternative possible causes for the plaintiffs injury. For
example, in a medical malpractice case a juror asked: "What were
other potential causes for the... damage that you observed and why
were they less plausible causes for [the plaintiffs injury] than the
cause that you have ascertained?" Others simply tried to clarify what
the witness had said. For example, in one case involving a claim of
infliction of emotional distress, a juror asked the psychologist, "What
does the term 'reasonable psychological probability' mean?". In some of
the questions, jurors probed the basis for the expert's conclusions. In a
motor vehicle case, a juror asked the engineer who testified about
what occurred as a result of the impact, "Not knowing how he was
sitting, or his weight, how can you be sure he hit his shoulder?". In a
products liability case, the jurors questioned a scientist on his
methods for testing and evaluating the product. And in several cases,
experts testified about standards of reasonable care and jurors
submitted questions asking whether specific governmental or industry
regulations applied and, if so, what the codes or regulations said. In
sum, the questions as a group reflect a picture consistent with central
rather than peripheral processing. In some cases, the expert testimony
did not turn out to be pertinent for the jurors in reaching their
verdicts (e.g., when a physician testified about the extent of a
plaintiffs injury and the jury concluded that the defendant had not
been negligent), but in others the jurors discussed the content of the
expert testimony extensively during deliberations. 75 Although
engagement of the juror questions with the content of the expert
testimony does not mean that jurors reached their decisions based on
the information that emerged in response to these questions, it adds
74. Chaiken, supra note 73, at 3; see generally Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The
Common Law Theory of Experts: Deference or Education?, 87 NW. U.L. REV. 1131 (1993).




further evidence that the jurors did not avoid directly dealing with the
content of the expert testimony.
4. Argumentative Juror Questioning
The most controversial aspect of juror questioning during trial
arises from the concern that a juror given the opportunity to submit
questions will assume the role of an advocate, taking sides early and
expressing opinions through the questioning process. Although the
jurors, whether or not they are permitted to submit questions during
trial, form impressions and consider alternative explanations as they
listen to the witnesses throughout to course of the trial,76 there is a
difference between being an active decision maker and assuming the
role of an advocate attempting to prove that one side deserves to win.
The prototypical argumentative question is a leading cross-
examination- style question that calls for a yes or no answer. Such
questions may take the form "Isn't it true that. . ." or "Wouldn't you
agree that. . ." or "Won't you admit that. . ." We would not expect
jurors, even when they are being argumentative, to express
themselves as a cross-examining attorney would, and we found no
instances of such questions from the jurors. Argumentative
questioning by the jurors took a less direct form, so our definition of
argumentative questioning had to be based not on form, but on the
substance of the answer that the question was likely to produce. We
examined each question, as well as any discussions of the question by
the jurors in the jury room, for evidence that a juror posed the
question to prove a point. For these argumentative questions, the
answer to the question was predictable or assumed that the witness
could not give a reasonable answer, and tended to favor one side.
Some questions were argumentative rather than information-
seeking on their face. Examples included, "Why didn't you see a doctor
until the next day if you were hit that hard?" [for plaintiff]; and
"Would weight reduction of a patient with knee problems reduce the
incidence of future problems?" [for plaintiffs expert; the plaintiff in
this case was substantially overweight]. Others, in context, expressed
suspicion about the witness's testimony (e.g., "If he was that bad, why
would you not communicate that information to other employers?" [for
defendant]) or suggested that the witness had engaged in bad
behavior (e.g., "If you were present, why didn't you help him?" [for
defendant]).
76. See supra pp. 9-10.
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Of the 829 questions jurors submitted during trial 69 (8.3%)
appeared argumentative. 77 In the majority of cases (30 of the 50
cases), jurors did not submit any argumentative questions. In 10 of the
cases, a single argumentative question was submitted. Strikingly, one
case was responsible for 10 of the argumentative questions, and the
same juror probably submitted 8 of those 10. 78 This pattern, while
based on a small sample, suggests that concerns that jurors permitted
to submit questions during trial will generally become adversarial and
argumentative in their questioning are unfounded. Although an
occasional juror may exceed reasonable bounds in suggesting
questions, the court retains control to intervene in such a situation,
declining to allow excessive or inappropriate questioning.
IV. STRIKING A BALANCE: PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING JUROR
QUESTIONS
When courts discuss whether it is advisable to permit juror
questions, they sometimes appear conflicted. Judges may acknowledge
that jurors appreciate the opportunity to submit questions and be
convinced that juror questions can help the jury understand and
evaluate the evidence. They also quite naturally wish to avoid any
changes in court procedures that unnecessarily increase trial time or
may threaten the neutrality of the jury. 79 The trials and the behavior
of the jurors we observed provide little evidence that permitting juror
questions significantly adds to the length of trials or transforms jurors
into advocates. The juror questions in Arizona required only a modest
commitment of court time and nearly all of the questions reflected
attempts by jurors to fill in and check their understanding of the
evidence, rather than to attack or defend a particular position or side,
to obtain information rather than to prove a point. No attorney on
cross-examination would take such an open and inquiring approach.
The procedures used to handle questions from jurors, however,
are crucial to creating an environment in the courtroom that will
ensure efficient and effective use of juror questions, maximizing the
likelihood that juror questions will contribute to juror understanding,
while minimizing the likelihood that a juror will step outside the
77. Two raters read 68 questions and agreed 92% of the time on whether the question had
an adversarial tone or not. The kappa value for this pair was .66.
78. The juror explicitly mentioned submitting 4 of the 10; the handwriting on the other
questions suggested that the same juror was responsible for 4 of the other argumentative
questions submitted in the case.
79. Spitzer v. Haims & Co., 587 A.2d 105, 113 (Conn. 1991) (citing courts' concerns in
allowing the procedure, but concluding that jury questioning is not prohibited); State v. Fisher,
789 N.E.2d 222, 229 (Ohio 2003).
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appropriate boundaries of the juror's role as trier of fact. When jurors
in modern American courts are permitted to submit questions for
witnesses during trial, they generally can do so only under controlled
circumstances. In some respects, the procedures used are similar
across courts and jurisdictions. Jurors are instructed that questions
should be submitted in writing, that the judge will discuss the
questions with the attorneys, and that legal rules might prevent the
judge from permitting some questions. In other ways, jurisdictions
and individual judges differ in the extent to which juror questions are
encouraged and in the procedures used to allow jurors to write down
and submit their questions.
The Arizona procedures attempt to carefully strike a balance,
enabling but not provoking juror questions. Judges administer a
standard preliminary instruction:
If you have a question you would like to ask a witness or me during the trial, write your
question down, but do not sign it. Hand the question to the bailiff during a recess. If you
have a question for a witness who is about to leave the witness stand, signal the bailiff
or me before the witness leaves the stand.
I will discuss the question with the lawyers. If I decide the question is proper, an answer
will be provided at the earliest logical opportunity. Keep in mind, however, that the
rules of evidence or other rules of law may prevent some questions from being asked. I
will apply the same legal standards to your questions as I do to the questions asked by
the lawyers.
If a particular question is not asked, do not guess why or what the answer might have
been. The failure to ask a question is not a reflection on the person asking it, and you
should not attach any significance to the failure to ask a question.
After each witness, before the witness steps down from the
witness stand, the judge turns to the jury to see if there are any
questions. When a juror submits a question, the judge then consults
with the attorneys out of the presence of the jury, usually at a sidebar,
and determines whether to ask the witness the juror's question. If
proper, the judge puts the question to the witness.80 On occasion, the
judge may reword the question in order to clarify the meaning or put
it in a form that will make it proper for the witness to answer (e.g.,
changing "Is [the plaintiffs] stamina back to pre-injury level?" to "Is
[the plaintiffs] stamina, based on your observation of her, back to her
pre-injury level?"). Attorneys are permitted to ask any necessary
follow-up questions. Arizona judges are accustomed to the procedure
and the process moves along efficiently.
80. Although an American Bar Association principle suggests that the court may permit a
party to ask the juror's question, see supra note 2, the better practice is for the court to ask the
question. Kristin DeBarba, Maintaining the Adversarial System: The Practice of Allowing Jurors
to Question Witnesses During Trial, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1521, 1548 (2002).
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Other jurisdictions provide less guidance. Most in principle
permit juror questions during trial, but leave both the decision
whether to permit questions in a particular trial and the procedures
used to implement the questioning process to the discretion of the
judge. The effect of this open-ended approach is that when judges
permit questions, they use a variety of procedures that can affect both
the type and number of questions that the jurors submit.
The procedures used are important. As laypersons, jurors look
to the court for guidance throughout the trial. Courts, by providing
guidance, can create an optimal environment for productive use of
juror questions, addressing almost all of the objections typically raised
about juror questions through the procedures they use in their
courtrooms. The goal is to strike a balance, both facilitating
appropriate juror participation and discouraging juror inquiry that
exceeds reasonable bounds. The key is a clear initial instruction for
the jurors, with follow-up as needed during the trial. Based on the
data from the Arizona Filming Project and a pilot project on jury trial
innovations recently conducted by the Seventh Circuit Bar
Association,81 we consider three issues that may arise when courts
permit juror questions, and the procedures courts can use to address
those issues.
A. Too Many Questions?
In the Arizona Filming Project, jurors submitted an average of
16.6 questions per trial (median = 10); in the Seventh Circuit Pilot
Project, 11 federal judges permitted questions in 20 federal civil jury
trials and jurors submitted an average of 29 questions per trial
(median = 15.5). In both jurisdictions, the number of questions was
directly related to the length of the trial (r = .55 in Arizona, and r =
.54 in the Seventh Circuit). The federal trials tended to be longer, and
when we control for the number of days of trial, the rate of questions
in the two jurisdictions was strikingly similar. The Arizona jurors
submitted an average of 5.3 questions per trial day (median = 3.8) and
the Seventh Circuit jurors submitted an average of 5.5 questions per
trial day (median = 3.9). Other reports of the number of questions
81. One of us (S.S.D.) is a member of the Seventh Circuit Bar Association's American Jury
Project Commission, charged with conducting the Pilot Project. After examining the questions
and interviewing the judges, she reported on the experiences with juror questions at the 7th
Circuit Conference in May, 2006. See James R. Figliulo, 7th Circuit Jury Project, FED. JUDGES
ASS'N NEWSL., June 30, 2006, available at https://www.federaljudgesassoc.org/egov
/docs/newsletters/38 47 391.asp (last visited Sept. 10, 2006).
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submitted by jurors have not controlled for trial length, so it is
difficult to directly compare them with these numbers.
8 2
The optimal number of juror questions, whether per case, or
per trial day, or per witness, should vary across cases and witnesses,
reflecting the clarity, difficulty, and importance of the testimony that
generates the questions. As shown in the analysis of questions from
the Arizona Filming Project, the questions from jurors do tend to focus
on central issues8 3 and witnesses.8 4 Although the judges in a majority
of the trials in the Seventh Circuit Pilot Project in which jurors
submitted questions reported that the number of questions was either
just right (60%) or there were too few questions (10%),85 judges did
preside over some cases in which they thought jurors submitted too
many questions (30%). The cases they labeled as having too many
questions averaged 9.9 questions per day of trial, those labeled as
about right averaged 4.1 questions a day, and those they thought
produced too few jurors questions averaged less than 1 (.2) per day.
Judges did, however, use more than the raw number of questions
submitted in deciding whether the number was appropriate. For
example, the same judge who found 11.8 questions per day to be too
many in one trial, reported that 12.5 questions per day in another trial
was just right.
It is impossible to determine out of context precisely how many
questions are too many, too few or "just right." Nonetheless, based on
the data from Arizona study, we can suggest some broad guidelines for
judging when jurors are likely to have exceeded a reasonable number.
In the Arizona cases we studied, 87% of the 392 live witnesses
received 5 or fewer total questions from the jury. Only 16 of the
witnesses drew more than 10 questions, but these 16 witnesses
received a majority (51%) of the argumentative questions that jurors
submitted. Moreover, the questions they received were twice as likely
to be argumentative (14% of their questions) as the questions
submitted for other witnesses (6%). This pattern suggests that courts
can discourage both unreasonable and excessive numbers of questions
by giving jurors some expectation about the level of questioning that is
appropriate. Recognizing that the value of juror questions varies
across cases and witnesses, it would not be advisable to set a
particular limit on the number of juror questions permitted. Indeed,
82. Mott, supra note 11, at 1113 (reporting a median of seven questions per case).
83. See supra Part IV.C.1.
84. See supra Part IV.C.
85. Judges, jurors, and a majority of the attorneys who participated in trials in which
questions were permitted responded positively to the experience. Figliulo, supra note 81; see
James F. Holderman, Trying the ABA's Jury Principles, 32 LITIG. (forthcoming 2006).
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one of the witnesses in the Arizona study who received more than 10
questions was an expert whose testimony was clarified considerably
by juror questions. Instead, appropriate guidance can be supplied by
an instruction that tells the jurors: "Based on our experience with
juror questions, you are unlikely to have more than a few questions for
a single witness."
As we demonstrate in the following section, jurors can be easily
discouraged from submitting questions, so it is important in conveying
an expectation about limited questioning that courts do not
inadvertently discourage jurors from submitting any questions (e.g.,
by suggesting that a question from a juror would be unusual or rarely
needed).
B. Too Few Questions?
Some evidence indicates that jurors can be inappropriately
discouraged from submitting questions that would help them to
understand and evaluate the evidence by the procedures court use. In
the Seventh Circuit Pilot Project, the jurors in 20 trials submitted
questions. In 7 additional trials, the judge gave an instruction at the
beginning of the case indicating that juror questions were permitted,
but none of the jurors ever submitted a question. The crucial
difference between the two groups of trials was whether or not the
judge mentioned the possibility of juror questions again after the
initial introduction. In the 20 trials in which jurors submitted
questions, 10 of the 11 judges asked the jury after each witness if
there were any questions; the 11 th asked only after the first witness
and received questions only for that witness. But the 3 judges who
presided in the 7 remaining trials in which no questions were
submitted mentioned juror questions only in their initial introduction
before testimony began and never again mentioned the possibility of
juror questions. It turned out that when the judges only mentioned
juror questions in their introductory remarks, many jurors simply did
not realize that questions were an option when the time for questions
came. On their post-trial questionnaires, only a third (38%) of the
jurors in these cases reported that they were permitted to submit
questions.
By contrast, among jurors who sat on trials in which the judge
mentioned the possibility of submitting questions during the trial,
99% understood that questions were an option. When the judges
mentioned only at the outset of the trial that jurors would be
permitted to ask questions, jurors received their only information
about questions at the same time that they received other important
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and sometimes complex information. When the judge never reinforced
the message about juror questions during the trial, most jurors did not
recall the embedded instruction. Moreover, by not turning to the
jurors to check for question after a witness finished testifying, judges
inadvertently made it necessary for a juror to essentially interrupt the
proceedings in order to submit a question. None did.
The experience of the Seventh Circuit Pilot Test with juror
questions demonstrates that a real opportunity to submit questions is
created only when jurors know it is there and when the jurors have a
reasonable opportunity to actually submit the questions they have. It
is apparent that a single mention of the procedure at the outset of a
trial is not sufficient.
C. Appropriate Questions and Court Intervention?
We saw relatively few instances of argumentative questions,
but those few questions may be avoidable if jurors receive some initial
advice on the kind of questions that are appropriate. The judge can
provide the jurors with a sense of the boundaries they should consider
in posing questions in their role as jurors. One possible (but as yet
untested) approach might include the following language:
During the trial, you may find it useful to submit a question for a witness to clarify or
help you understand the evidence. You should always phrase any questions in a neutral
way that does not express an opinion about the case or a witness. Remember that at the
end of the trial, you will be deciding the case. For that reason, you must keep an open
mind until you have heard all of the evidence and the closing arguments of counsel, and
I have given you final instructions on the law.
8 6
On the rare occasions that a juror submits an argumentative
question, the judge should either rephrase the question or should not
ask it, even if the question would otherwise be proper. Jurors are
always told at the beginning of the case that some of their questions
may not be asked and they generally accept it philosophically when
the question is not asked.8 7 Out-of-role questions should be recognized
as in this category. If the judge has instructed the jury earlier on the
appropriately neutral form that juror questions should take, an
argumentative question may also be an occasion for reminding the
jurors of that earlier instruction.
When courts permit jurors to submit questions for witnesses
during trial, they increase the satisfaction of the citizens who serve as
jurors and can foster greater juror understanding of the evidence.
86. Adapted from language suggested by the Honorable David Hamilton, Southern District
of Indiana, and the Honorable William Donnino, Nassau County, State of New York.
87. See Diamond et al., supra note 26, at 27.
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However, this does not mean that courts should relinquish the
ordinary control they exercise in the courtroom. By guiding jurors
with clear instructions on the procedures that will be used and the
kind of questions that are permissible, courts can both promote juror
satisfaction with the trial process and encourage informed decision
making.
V. CONCLUSION
Juror questions submitted during trial provide an unusual
opportunity for both attorneys and researchers to learn about how
jurors are reacting to the trial. At the same time, it is possible to read
too much into the questions the jurors pose. The juror questions that
are submitted during trial, as opposed to juror questions submitted
during deliberations, come from individual jurors and do not always
reflect what the jury as a whole thinks about the case. Even the
individual questioners may ultimately come to focus on other issues in
deciding the case.88
Juror questions and jury talk about the topics covered in those
questions do, however, provide valuable insights about where jurors
focus their attention during trial, what they struggle with, and how
they attempt to deal with the frequently incomplete and inconsistent
evidence that emerges in a trial. The primary focus of juror questions
is on understanding and evaluating the evidence relevant to central
legal issues in the case. In the course of that effort, the jurors sort
through the evidence looking for reliable sources of information,
comparing for consistency among sources and probing available
measures and standards. This commonsense cross-checking approach
reveals a palpable consciousness of the adversary nature of the
courtroom setting. Moreover, the jurors recognize that ultimately it
will be up to them to draw conclusions about the competing claims.
Jurors' questions reflect, sometimes awkwardly, but often insightfully,
their attempt to resolve the ambiguities and uncertainties that
competing accounts naturally evoke. The questions reveal that, rather
than assuming the role of advocates during the trial, jurors are
instead intensely engaged in the task of problem-solving.
88. In their closing arguments, attorneys in 20 of the cases referred to the questions the
jurors submitted during trial, focusing on specific questions in 18 of the cases. During the




Jurors tend to be enthusiastic about the opportunity to submit
questions during trial. s9 As one of the jurors from the Arizona Filming
Project commented to the other members of her jury, "I think it's good
that juries can ask questions because they are the ones that have to
decide." Attorneys and judges have initially approached the prospect
of juror questions with some trepidation, but generally become more
favorable after they have had some experience with the process and
the nature of the questions that the jurors ask.90 What do these
results imply about the value for the trial process of permitting juror
questions during trial, beyond that of assisting the jury? An
observation from Judge Frank Easterbrook is relevant here. 91 Arguing
that counsel appearing before an appellate court should be happy to
focus on court questions rather than on attorney presentations, he
writes: "Far better to learn of the judge's qualms while time remains
to give the answer, than to be shocked when the opinion appears."
89. B. Michael Dann & Valerie P. Hans, Recent Evaluative Research on Jury Trial
Innovations, 41 CT. REV. 12, 28 (2004) (reporting on findings from various studies).
90. Id. at 15.
91. Interview by Howard J. Bashman with Frank Easterbrook, Judge, U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Aug. 2, 2004), http://howappealing.law.com20q/2004_08_
01_20q-appellateblog-archive.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2006).
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